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1. Introduction
Foreign ownership has gradually become an inevitable trend in the era of internation-
al economic integration, in which stock markets play a supporting role in promoting 
foreign capital investments into domestic companies (Foong & Lim, 2016). Foreign 
ownership has in turn contributed to the development of capital markets and has be-
come an essential factor in diversifying ownership structure in many listed companies. 
The question of whether foreign ownership relates to the development and stability 
of stock markets has drawn the attention of academics and policy-makers. However, 
current literature has mixed findings on the association between foreign ownership and 
the fluctuation of stock returns. 
Several studies indicated a negative impact (Wang, 2007; Li et al., 2011; Vo, 2015). 
Wang (2007) gives two economic interpretations of a negative relationship between 
foreign investment and volatility. First, attracting foreign investors is considered to wid-
en the investor base for a stock, which leads to greater risk-sharing and lowers volatility 
(Mitton, 2006; Wang, 2007). It is an investor base-broadening effect which is identified 
by Merton (1987). Second, more substantial ownership of foreign shareholders reduc-
es the capital cost of a firm under the well-known leverage effect theory. In other words, 
companies can take advantage of foreign investments instead of debts, which helps to 
reduce the financial burdens and risks. Besides, foreign investors could improve the 
information quality in local stock markets, provide better corporate control and report-
ing standards, enhance the corporate governance environments and thus significantly 
reduce transaction costs and  informational costs (Li et al., 2011; Vo, 2015). Indeed, 
foreign investors usually choose well-managed companies to invest, and this should 
further accelerate improvement in corporate governance (Leuz et al., 2009). Anoth-
er explanation is that foreign investors will appoint representatives or seek experts to 
coordinate and monitor corporate governance. Min and Bowman (2015) also believe 
that foreign investors place considerable merit on the appointment of independent di-
rectors in the firms listed on the Korea Exchange.
On the contrary, many other studies showed a positive impact of foreign investment 
on firm-level volatility (Bae et al., 2004; Bohl & Brzeszczynski, 2006; Han & Singal, 
2000). Bae et al. (2004) suggest that foreign ownership can cause significant firm-level 
return volatility in an emerging market because it makes stock returns more vulnerable 
to the world market risk. In other words, the local stock markets are very volatile with 
foreign capital movements because emerging markets are not very liquid and trans-
parent (Han & Singal, 2000). Besides, many foreign investors pursue short-term or 
speculative investment strategies (Bohl & Brzeszczynski, 2006; Stiglitz, 2000), which 
promotes frequent trading activities. According to Zhang (2010), a higher trading vol-
ume creates price movements and reflects a higher level of volatility. Also, portfolio ad-
justments by large foreign institutional investors are likely to result in significant price 
fluctuations (Bae et al., 2004).
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In Vietnam, economic reforms under “Doi Moi” policy, which was launched in 1986 
to transition the country from a centralized economy to a market-oriented economy, 
created a wave of equitization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and broadened op-
portunities for foreign investors. In the 1990s, the Vietnam stock market had not yet 
been established, so restructuring was implemented by focusing on the small-sized and 
medium-sized SOEs, and by integrating plural SOEs into groups. At the end of 2001, 
there were 18 large-scale general corporations under the management of the Prime 
Minister and 78 small-scale general corporations managed by various ministries and 
provincial governments. Until 2000, the first stock exchange was launched in Ho Chi 
Minh city with only two listed companies, which made its milestone in the transitional 
process of Vietnam’s economy. Five years later, another stock market was established in 
Hanoi. After 17 years of development, the total number of listed companies was 728, 
and market capitalization was 125.31 billion USD, as shown in Figure 1. 
Under international economic integration, the gradual removal of the restrictions 
on foreign ownership has boosted foreign capital inflows into the Vietnam stock mar-
ket (My & Truong, 2011). Notably, the Decree No. 60/2015/ND-CP permits foreign 
investors to own up to 100 percent of the equity (instead of 49 percent as promulgated 
before) in most public Vietnamese companies, except for companies in specific restrict-
ed sectors. The increased presence of foreign investors is expected to improve trans-
parency for listed companies and hence provide stock price stabilization. Therefore, it 
drives us to investigate whether attracting more foreign ownership can be considered as 
a mechanism to control stock return volatility for the listed firms.
FIGURE 1. Number of listed companies and market capitalization in Vietnam
Source: https://data.worldbank.org
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However, foreign investors in many large listed companies in the Vietnam stock mar-
ket are usually large financial institutions. Their high proportions of equity can promote 
them to become large shareholders with the opportunities to divert firm resources for 
their private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (entrenchment effect). To 
hide their self-serving behaviors, entrenched large shareholders usually withhold unfa-
vorable information or selectively disclose information (McConnell & Servaes, 1990), 
which can lead to more information asymmetries. The impact of foreign investors on 
stock return volatility in such firms should be thus evaluated with more caution.  
To the best of our knowledge, most studies related to foreign ownership in Vietnam 
mainly focus on its impact on performance rather than stock return volatility, except for 
Vo (2015). However, our study provides a more general empirical investigation for the 
entire Vietnamese stock market, while Vo (2015) only focuses on studying the firms 
listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange, which is one of the two largest stock 
exchanges in Vietnam. More significantly, we do not only examine the direct influence 
of foreign ownership on the volatility of stock returns but also further consider this 
association in relation to firm size. It helps to bring a thorough explanation of foreign 
investors’ participation in stock return volatility in the context of an emerging market. 
The main results of this study regarding the influence of foreign ownership on stock 
return volatility are as follows. The estimated regressions show a negative effect of foreign 
ownership on stock return volatility after controlling for firm characteristics and poten-
tial endogeneity problems. It indicates that the increased presence of foreign investors 
contributes to stabilizing the firm-level fluctuation of stock returns because they have 
many advantages (such as substantial capital, investment experiences) to manage risks, 
as well as enhance a better corporate governance environment. From a different per-
spective, foreign investors in Vietnam tend to invest long-term and hold more strategic 
portfolios, which also explains the low return volatility. However, the negative influence 
of foreign ownership becomes weaker in large firms because large foreign investors in 
such firms tend to become majority shareholders and have the power for entrenchment.
The paper process is as follows: In Section 2, we review the impact of foreign own-
ership on stock return volatility in the Vietnam stock market and the destabilizing in-
fluence of firm size. In Section 3, we present the model and data. Section 4 shows the 
results of the empirical analysis. A conclusion is provided in Section 5.
2. Literature review
2.1. The impact of foreign ownership on stock return volatility  
in the Vietnam stock market
Vietnam’s securities law was issued in 2006 and amended in 2010 but did not cite for-
eign ownership limits. However, Decision No. 238/2005/QD-TT on the percentage 
of foreign parties’ participation in the Vietnam securities market was considered as a 
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big step towards attracting foreign investment capitals, by raising the limit on foreign 
holding of listed companies’ stocks from 30 percent to 49 percent. Then, it was replaced 
by Decision No. 55/2009/QD-TT on holding rates of foreign investors in the Vietnam 
securities market, but the 49 percent foreign ownership cap on most local companies 
remained in force until 2015.
As an effort to attract more foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market, the gov-
ernment issued Decree No. 60/2015/ND-CP on 26 June 2015, amending and supple-
menting several articles of Decree No. 58/2012/ND-CP dated 20 July 2012 provid-
ing details and implementation guidelines on several articles of the Law on Securities. 
Among the changes, the most welcomed amendment is that public companies operat-
ing in unconditional sectors can remove foreign ownership limits. Although the move 
helped the listed companies to remove the limit and seek more foreign investors, only 
a handful of firms, including Vinamilk, Domesco Medical Import Export, and DHG 
Pharma, raised the limits.
FIGURE 2. The percentage of foreign trading volume over the whole market
Source: Data from Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange
Foreign ownership is expected to provide better corporate governance and trans-
parency improvement in the listed companies. First, many large firms in the Vietnam 
stock market have historically been inefficient state-owned companies, so the equiti-
zation (i.e. partial privatization) and divestment of state-owned enterprises to foreign 
investors aim to promote their efficiency. Second, foreign investors in Vietnamese listed 
companies tend to be institutions (such as mutual funds, hedge funds, and foreign in-
vestment banks) with a long history of successful investment in many other stock mar-
kets. The annual reports of the Vietnam Security Depository (www.vsd.vn) also prove 
that the growth of foreign institutional trading accounts is higher than that of foreign 
individual trading accounts. The total number of foreign trading accounts rose from 
11,257 accounts in 2008 up to 22,561 accounts in 2017 (a 2-fold increase), of which the 
number of foreign institutional trading accounts increased from below 1,000 accounts 
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in 2008 to 2,865 accounts in 2017 (more than 2.8 times). Such financial institutions are 
expected to improve the corporate governance environments as well as control stock 
price volatility better.
Another study by Vo (2016b) adds that foreign investors in the Vietnam stock mar-
ket focus on long-run perspectives rather than short-term gain by investigating the 
impact of foreign ownership on the corporate risk-taking activity for a sample of 263 
Vietnamese listed companies in the 2007-2014 period. In other words, they pursue an 
inactive buy-and-hold investment strategy, which reduces the need for frequent trading 
for price discovery (Batten & Vo, 2015; Nguyen, 2017). Their low proportions of the 
trading volume and tendency towards the net purchase, as shown in Figure 2, also sup-
port this strategy. Also, their trading activities tend to become the pattern for domestic 
investors (Nguyen, 2017). These findings also contribute to explaining the stability of 
stock prices from a trading perspective.
From the above arguments, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H1: Foreign ownership has a negative impact on stock return volatility.
2.2 Firm size, foreign ownership, and stock return volatility
Many previous studies indicate that foreign investors favor large and well-operated firms 
(Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001; Kang & Stulz, 1997; Lin & Shiu, 2003). First, small-
size firms are usually limited in their resources and experience to attract foreign inves-
tors, while large firms have more financial and technical capabilities, the economies of 
scope (Damanpour, 2010). Second, large firms tend to have fewer competitors thanks 
to their monopoly power. Tsang (2005) also finds that the level of foreign ownership 
should be negatively associated with the degree of industrial competition. Third, large 
firms usually have good financial performance and high transparency, which attracts a 
significant interest from foreign investors, especially in emerging stock markets.  An-
other reason is that small-sized firms’ market capitalization is too small for large institu-
tional investors, which drives foreign investors to narrow their options to larger firms. 
Batten and Vo (2015), who investigate the determinants of foreign ownership in the 
Vietnam stock market, also indicate that foreign investors allocate a disproportionately 
high share of their capitals to large firms. 
Holding a high proportion of equity, large financial institutions in Vietnam tend to 
become majority shareholders and increase control over corporate decisions to serve 
their own interests against those of other investors under the entrenchment effect 
perspective. Brockman and Yan (2009) claim that the increase in foreign ownership 
can also cause more information asymmetries. Besides, Vo (2016c) states that firms 
with substantial foreign ownership have a close tie with local governments, especially 
in emerging markets with weak corporate governance and poor institutional aspects. 
Hence, we propose the second hypothesis as follows:
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H2: The stabilizing effect of foreign ownership on the fluctuation of stock returns becomes weaker 
in large firms.
3. Data and methodology
3.1 Model specification
According to Chen et al. (2013) and Vo (2015), the impact of foreign ownership on 
stock return volatility is presented as follows:
VOL�� = β� + β�FOWN��+ ∑β�*Control��+ ε��
 
 (1)
Furthermore, we also want to further investigate this relationship under the desta-
bilizing effect of firm size. Consequently, the above model is restructured in the equa-
tion (2):
VOL�� = β� + β�FOWN��+	β�FOWN��*FSIZE��+ ∑β�*Control��+ ε��
 
 (2)
Following Cosset et al. (2016) and Hasan et al. (2017), we use two measures of 
stock return volatility (VOLit): (i) the standard deviation of daily stock returns on a 
fiscal year basis and (ii) the standard deviation of the residuals from the market model: 
Rit = αi + βiRMt + εit on a fiscal year basis (Rit donates the daily stock returns; RMt rep-
resents the daily market returns based on the VN-index; the εi,t stands for the residuals). 
FOWNit is the proportion of shares held by foreign investors. Controlit are controlling 
variables.
Our regression model also incorporates other variables that previous studies suggest 
might affect VOL.
Firm size (FSIZE) is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. According 
to Vo (2015), stock return volatility is driven by firm characteristics, particularly firm 
size. Pástor & Veronesi (2003) also find a negative relation between return volatility 
and firm size.Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
The stock price of highly leveraged firms tends to be more volatile since these firms are 
supposed to have higher bankruptcy risk (Wei & Zhang, 2006; Chen et al.,2013). Re-
turns on equity (ROE) is defined as net income divided by shareholders’ equity. Both 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and Wei and Zhang (2006) confirm that firms with lower 
ROE are expected to experience higher stock return fluctuations.Two control variables 
to capture board composition characteristics: Non-executive director ratio (NON_EX) 
is measured as the number of non-executive directors to total board members, and board 
size (lnBSIZE) is calculated as the natural logarithm of total members on board. Many 
studies such as Cheng (2008), Pathan (2009), Nakano and Nguyen (2012), Huang and 
Wang (2015) prove that corporate risk is related to board size and board independence. 
State ownership (STATE) is the number of shares held by the state to the total number of 
shares outstanding. This variable is included in the model because Vietnam historically 
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installed a centralized economy characterized by state ownership. Moreover, state own-
ership tends to offer policy and resource benefits (Zhou et al., 2017) which allow state-
owned companies to reduce volatility. Price to book value (PB) is the ratio of the market 
value of equity to the book value of equity, which is a proxy for growth opportunity. 
Stock liquidity (LIQ) is calculated as the proportion of trading days in one year in which 
the stock return is non-zero. This variable should be controlled in the model because the 
movements of the stock price are highly associated with trading activities (Zhang, 2010).
Firm age (lnFAGE) is also included because the corporate risk is found to be higher for 
younger firms (Bartram et al., 2012; Rubin & Smith, 2009). We also include industry 
and year fixed effects to control for industry-specific and aggregate time-varying factors.
3.2 Data
Our research sample comprises 160 non-financial companies listed on Vietnamese 
stock markets (including HNX – Hanoi Stock Exchange and HOSE – Ho Chi Minh 
Stock Exchange) from 2008 to 2017. The listed companies are classified according to 
the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 2008 applied in Vietnam.
Our data was collected from various sources: governance-related variables such as 
foreign ownership, state ownership, and non-executive director ratio were manually 
collected reviewing annual reports which are available on the www.vietstock.vn (a lead-
ing website providing financial information, market data, and investing tools for insti-
tutional and individual investors in Vietnam). Other financial variables were collected 
from DataStream. Any additional data or information is directly gathered from compa-
nies’ websites if necessary. From DataStream, we downloaded a list of companies whose 
stock price is available from January 1, 2008. Our sample consisted of 219 companies 
after we excluded financial companies such as banks, securities, insurance, and finan-
cial services because these companies act as market makers. Additionally, the foreign 
ownership restrictions in the listed banks are stricter than other listed companies. For 
a long time, Vietnam imposed restrictions on foreign ownership in domestically listed 
firms: up to 49 percent of the equity for the listed companies and up to 30 percent for 
the listed banks. Since the Decree No. 60/2015/ND-CP took effect, the government 
has removed the existing 49 percent foreign ownership cap on the listed firms, but the 
foreign ownership limit in the banking industry has remained unchanged at 30 percent. 
In the process of collecting the governance-related data, we continued to exclude 59 
companies due to too many missing observations.
4. Results and discussions
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics on board and ownership structure of our sam-
ple, as well as firm characteristics. The mean (median) of foreign ownership in the 
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sample is 11.91% (4.84%), quite close to the reported figures (12.29% and 5.98%) by 
Vo (2015) for a sample of 268 non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock 
exchange in the 2006-2012 period. The two volatility measures do not have much dif-
ference in their mean values (3.03 and 2.75) and standard deviations (1.14 and 1.12).
TABLE 1. Description statistics
  Obs Mean SD Min 25th per-centile
50th per-
centile
75th per-
centile Max
VOL1 (%) 1600 3.03 1.14 1.06 2.35 2.98 3.58 32.99
VOL2 (%) 1600 2.75 1.12 0.93 2.14 2.62 3.27 33.05
FSIZE 1600 20.30 1.44 16.31 19.27 20.19 21.23 24.69
LEV 1600 0.48 0.22 0.02 0.30 0.50 0.66 0.95
ROE 1600 0.13 0.16 -2.32 0.06 0.12 0.19 3.34
PB 1589 1.13 0.91 0.13 0.60 0.91 1.40 12.95
LIQ 1600 0.73 0.19 0.02 0.65 0.78 0.88 0.99
NON_EX 1600 0.57 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.75 1.00
BSIZE 1600 5.52 1.18 2 5 5 6 11
FAGE 1600 6.79 3.30 1 4 7 9 17
STATE 
(%) 1593 31.63 22.85 0 8.19 34.71 51.00 84.44
FOWN 
(%) 1340 11.91 14.67 0 1.37 4.84 17.39 65.16
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics among the variables of this study, where VOL1 and VOL2 
are the two measures of the stock return volatility, FOWN is the proportion of shares held by foreign inves-
tors, FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, ROE 
is return on equity, PB is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, LIQ is the 
proportion of trading days in one year in which the stock return is non-zero, NON_EX is the percentage of 
non-executive directors on board, BSIZE is the total number of directors on board, STATE is the proportion 
of shares held by state shareholders, FAGE is the number of years from the time the company is listed for the 
first time in the Vietnam stock market. For interpretation purposes, the descriptive statistics of board size 
and firm age are calculated on the basis of levels instead of logarithmic form.
As reported in Table 2, FOWN is negatively related to VOL1 and VOL2, which is 
consistent with the above expectation. The correlation matrix gives no suggestion to 
any serious multicollinearity concerns since none of the correlation coefficients among 
independent variables are larger than the value of 0.8. We also calculate the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) to check again for any multicollinearity issues in our model, 
but all VIFs are low, with a mean of 1.46 (not reported in the table). It is supported by 
Chatterjee and Hadi (2015), who suggest that a value of VIF larger than 10 indicates 
the presence of a multicollinearity problem.
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TABLE 2. Correlation matrix
  VOL1 VOL2 FOWN FSIZE LEV ROE NON_EX lnBSIZE STATE PB LIQ VIFs
FOWN -0.30 -0.31 1.77
FSIZE -0.34 -0.37 0.42 2.11
LEV 0.10 0.10 -0.28 0.26 1.42
ROE -0.10 -0.14 0.18 0.08 -0.11 1.13
NON_EX -0.04 0.00 0.10 0.11 -0.08 -0.04 1.09
lnBSIZE -0.17 -0.19 0.36 0.33 -0.04 0.04 0.02 1.25
STATE -0.02 -0.05 -0.15 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.17 1.17
PB -0.13 -0.14 0.38 0.19 -0.17 0.25 0.10 0.11 0.02 1.24
LIQ -0.01 -0.21 0.19 0.37 0.00 0.18 -0.03 0.17 -0.05 0.07 1.73
lnFAGE -0.23 0.01 0.11 0.13 -0.04 -0.17 0.21 0.01 -0.17 0.02 -0.44 1.64
Note: The table presents correlation matrix among the variables of this study, where VOL1 and VOL2 are 
the two measures of the stock return volatility, FOWN is the proportion of shares held by foreign investors, 
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, ROE is 
return on equity, PB is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, LIQ is the propor-
tion of trading days in one year in which the stock return is non-zero, NON_EX is the percentage of non-
executive directors on board, lnBSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors on board, 
STATE is the proportion of shares held by state shareholders, lnFAGE is the natural logarithm of firm age. 
VIFs are variance inflation factors.
4.2. The impacts of foreign ownership and firm size
Table 3 provides the estimated results of foreign ownership on stock return volatility 
by using year and industry fixed effects regressions with firm-level clustered standard 
errors. We use both current and one-year future volatility as proxies for the dependent 
variable. According to Wang (2013), the future one-year volatility helps to better con-
firm the causal effect of foreign ownership on stock return volatility. After controlling 
for some board characteristics (such as board independence, board size, state owner-
ship) and other firm characteristics, we find that the coefficients on FOWN are statisti-
cally negative. This result implies the role and benefits of foreign investors in enhancing 
better corporate governance and reducing information asymmetries, especially when 
many listed firms in the Vietnam stock market have historically been inefficient state-
owned companies. Foreign investments in Vietnamese firms also play an essential role 
as an alternative financial source under well-known leverage effect theory. From a trad-
ing behavior perspective, the negative impact of ownership can be explained by the 
buy-and-hold investment strategy because there tend to be long-term investors, rather 
than short-term speculators.
 The obtained result supports the first hypothesis, indicating that a high proportion 
of foreign ownership plays as one of the determinants to mitigate the fluctuation of 
stock returns. Our finding is in line with that of the previously published studies in oth-
er emerging countries. Wang (2013) showed the calming effect of foreign ownership 
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on stock return volatility for a sample of Indonesian firms listed on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange from 1996 to 2000. Another study by Li et al. (2011) confirms that the sta-
bilizing effect of large foreign ownership is present in 31 emerging markets. Both Wang 
(2013) and Li et al. (2011) imply that establishing an ownership structure towards in-
ternational liberalization and integration is crucial to risk management. 
Regarding the effect of firm size, the coefficients on FSIZE are negative and signif-
icant in all regressions, thereby confirming that large firms tend to reduce stock return 
volatility due to their better governance and less information asymmetry. The negative 
relationship also supports the viewpoint of Damanpour (2010) that larger companies 
have more advantages to control stock price fluctuations. 
4.3. The destabilizing role of firm size
Regarding the destabilizing effect of firm size on the relationship between foreign own-
ership and stock return volatility, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term be-
tween FOWN and FSIZE turns out to be positive at the significance level of 0.01 in Ta-
ble 3. The converse results on FOWN suggest that firm size tends to weaken the foreign 
ownership-volatility relationship. In other words, the presence of foreign investors in 
large firms helps to decrease the stability of stock prices. It is because most of the foreign 
shareholders in such firms are large financial institutions whose high proportion of equi-
ty is associated with board membership. As majority shareholders and corporate insid-
ers, such foreign investors tend to retain weak corporate governance or deter the release 
of specific-firm information to the market on purpose of easily facilitating their potential 
expropriation. Such inadequate information disclosure causes more information asym-
metries between minority and majority shareholders, which leads to more volatility.
In line with the viewpoint, Viet (2013) also made two significant contributions to 
explain foreign investors’ behavior in the Vietnam stock market by using a sample of 
407 non-financial listed firms from 2006 to 2010. First, foreign investors seem to prefer 
firms with a large size and higher market reputation. Second, there exists an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance, which indi-
cates that the negative effects of foreign shareholders on firm performance may occur 
if their ownership reaches a certain high level. He explains that too high level of foreign 
ownership can allow foreign investors to influence several vital aspects of invested firms 
and weaken firm efficiency. 
To investigate the second hypothesis in more detail, we split our sample into two 
sub-samples, corresponding to small and large firms, by comparing the firm size of each 
firm operating in a given industry in a given year with the average firm size of all firms 
operating in the same industry during that year. The estimates presented in Table 4 
show that foreign ownership has a weaker significant impact on current volatility and 
insignificant impact on future volatility in large firms. Moreover, the negative coeffi-
cients on FSIZE have smaller absolute values for large firms. All these results confirm 
the destabilizing role of firm size.
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4.4. Potential endogeneity and robustness tests
Although unobservable heterogeneity can be eliminated by the application of the fixed 
effects model, the estimated coefficients may still be biased if the dependent variable 
and explanatory variables are simultaneously determined. According to Roberts and 
White (2012) and Wintoki et al. (2012), this endogeneity problem should be taken 
into more consideration because it can undermine causal inference in corporate gov-
ernance studies.  The studies by Vo (2015), Li et al. (2011), and Chen et al. (2013) 
examining the impact of foreign ownership on stock return volatility in emerging mar-
kets mention the possibility of endogeneity problem in their model by referring to the 
previous studies in developed countries such as Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist 
and Robertsson (2001). However, all their results are not changed after they apply 
first-difference regressions, IV regressions, and GMM regressions to address the po-
tential endogeneity. Chen et al. (2013) even conclude that their study is less subjective 
to the potential endogeneity problems. Despite that, we still decide to re-estimate our 
model by instrumental variable regressions with industry and year fixed effects to check 
the robustness of our estimates. 
Besides, according to Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Raheja (2005), high infor-
mation asymmetry discourages firms from increasing the monitoring activities from 
independent directors because it is costly to transfer firm-specific information to out-
siders, especially when the supervising role of independent directors is proved to be 
not inefficient in an emerging market like Vietnam (Van Tuan & Tuan, 2016). The pos-
itive coefficients on NON_EX in Table 3 also support this viewpoint. In other words, 
high return volatility in a period may lead to a change in the non-executive ratio. Thus, 
NON_EX variable is likely to be another endogenous variable.
To address the potential problems, we use FOWNt-1 (the lagged value of foreign 
ownership) as an instrument for FOWN (Han et al., 2015). Another potential instru-
ment for FOWN is DIR_EXP (the average working years of the directors in the com-
pany) because boards with long-serving members tend to be averse to strategic change 
and reluctant to internationalization (Golden & Zajac, 2001), which deters foreign 
investment. According to Li (1994) and Mak and Li (2001), board size has a nega-
tive impact on the composition of outside board members. Besides, individual director 
attributes (such as directors’ age, experience, and so on) are associated with the envi-
ronment in which non-executive directors perform their duties. Therefore, we decide 
to use ∆lnBSIZEt-1 (the lag of the change in lnBSIZE), DIR_EXP (the average working 
years of the directors in the company), DIR_AGE (the average age of the directors 
on board) as instrumental variables for NON_EX. Then, F-tests and Hansen tests of 
over-identifying restrictions are necessary to confirm the validity of these instruments.
We observe that the negative relationship between foreign ownership and volatil-
ity does not change in Table 5 and Table 6. All the coefficients on FOWN are signifi-
cantly negative, confirming the risk-controlling role of foreign investors as well as their 
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long-term investment strategy. Regarding the second hypothesis, the destabilizing role 
of FSIZE remains valid because all the estimated coefficients on the interaction term 
are still significantly positive in Table 6. Besides, the validity of our instruments can 
be justified by the obtained F-statistics of more than 10 in the first-stage regression, 
and Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions indicate that the instruments are not 
correlated with the error term. All the diagnostics tests support the conclusion that the 
instruments used are reasonable, and the regression results are consistent.
5. Conclusion
Stock market liberalization has gradually become a global trend, forcing the govern-
ments in emerging markets to gradually remove restrictions on foreign ownership. By 
allowing foreign investors to participate in the Vietnam stock market under Decision 
No. 238/2005/QD-TT and relaxing foreign ownership rules to attract capital and sup-
port local companies under Decree No. 60/2015/ND-CP, the Vietnam stock market 
has witnessed a significant inflow of foreign investments. Therefore, investigating the 
impact of foreign ownership on stock return volatility in the Vietnam stock market con-
tributes to shedding light on the role and investment behavior of foreign ownership in 
the context of an emerging market.
The corporate governance literature usually focuses on explaining the stabilizing 
impact of foreign ownership but does not consider the association in relation to firm 
characteristics. By using a sample of 160 companies listed in the Vietnam stock mar-
kets in the period 2008-2017, we observe a negative influence of foreign ownership on 
stock return volatility, but notably, the calming impact of foreign ownership becomes 
weaker in large firms. Our findings prove to be consistent when we apply instrumental 
variable regressions and use the future one-year volatility as an alternative measure of 
the dependent variable. 
However, our study was limited to the detailed identification of foreign investors’ 
characteristics. It would, therefore, be interesting to investigate the impact of foreign 
institutional ownership or large foreign shareholders’ ownership on the volatility in 
emerging markets. Such further studies could contribute to a more in-depth under-
standing of the role of foreign investors in the stability or the Vietnam stock market.
Finally, our findings also offer some implications of corporate governance in Viet-
nam as well as in emerging countries. First, attracting foreign investors should be consid-
ered as a risk control mechanism, but its effectiveness may depend on firm size. Second, 
improving the regulations on corporate governance towards removing the restrictions 
on foreign ownership is essential to enhance the quality of governance systems and 
risk management. In brief, the effect of foreign ownership on stock return volatility in 
Vietnamese listed companies will give more significant insights into the role of foreign 
investors in emerging markets.
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